Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 55 by Victor Caston;

Author:Victor Caston; [Caston, Victor]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780192573384
Publisher: OUP Premium
Published: 2018-10-25T00:00:00+00:00

Two Classic Problems in the Stoic Theory of Time

ricardo salles

In this paper I deal with two philosophical problems in the Stoic theory of time that have been extensively discussed by the Stoics and in modern Stoic scholarship. The First Problem concerns the reality of the present. Is the present something distinct from the past and the future? Or is any time either past or future? The Second Problem affects the connection between change and time. Does the passage of time require a change in the events that take place in time? The Stoics, it is sometimes alleged, uphold contradictory views on each of these two problems. My overall aim is to prove that, contrary to appearances, the Stoic theory of time is internally consistent, and that the solutions to these problems are tightly connected to central issues in Stoic metaphysics.

Regarding the First Problem, the conflicting views are two claims. One is C1, the claim that ‘no time is wholly present’ (οὐθεὶς ὅλως ἐνίσταται χρόνος). The other is C2, the claim that some times are present after all as opposed to past or future, namely those that are ‘said to be present in a broad sense’ (ἐνεστάναι κατὰ πλάτος λέγεσθαι).

C1—as I explain below—implies that any putative present is fully divisible into parts that are either past or future. So if C2 is to be consistent with C1, a ‘broadly’ present time too must be fully divisible into parts that are either past or future. Now, from a general philosophical standpoint, it is reasonable to suppose that, in order for a time to be really present, it must be distinct from the past and the future. But how could a broadly present time satisfy this condition if it is indeed fully divisible into times that are either past or future?1

Regarding the Second Problem, the conflicting views are three claims. One is C3, linking the passage of time to change, which comprises two subclaims. C3a affirms that some change in events is a basic necessary and sufficient condition for the passage of time. C3b states a necessary and sufficient condition for a sequence of events to constitute a change.

C3a For any times t and t*, such that t and t* are either instants or periods of time, t and t* are successive and, therefore, distinct from one another (one is earlier than the other) if and only if the events E that occur at t and the events E* that occur at t* are such that the sequence E–E* is a change.

C3b For any sequence S of successive events E–E*, S is a change if and only if E and E* are different in type.

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